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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vi.
CaseNo.20040939-CA
FRANKLIN ERIC HALLS,
Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION

Appellant appeals from the Judgment and Commitment to Utah State Prison
entered October 5, 2004, in this case involving his convictions in the Seventh Judicial
District Court for the County of San Juan, State of Utah, for Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony; Unlawful Possession of Imitation
Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor; and Possession of Paraphernalia, a Class
B Misdemeanor. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal in this
matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-2a-3(2)(e) and 77-18a-l(l)(a) (2003) and
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 3(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE #1; Did the "reasonable doubt" jury instruction presented at trial
correctly state the law?
STANDARD OF REVIEW; Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is
reviewable under a correction of error standard, with no particular deference given to the
trial court's ruling. State v. Reyes. 2004 Ut App 8, f 14, 84 P.3d 841, citing State v.
Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993).

Determining the propriety of the

instructions submitted to the jury presents a question of law, which this Court reviews for
correctness. Id. at 115, see, Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468,471 (Utah App. 1993).
ISSUE #2: Did the trial court err in enhancing Halls' sentence based only on the
stipulation of the parties that he had previously been convicted when the prior judgment
did not indicate as such?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews the trial court's imposition of a
sentence for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah
Ct.App.1997). "[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal
judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said
that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v.
Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).
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DETERMINATi v E, ^jr«a 111 oTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
I.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDS. V, VI and

n.

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I §§ 7 and 12.

XIV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 12, 2004, Franklin Eric Halls (hereinafter "Halls") was charged by
Information in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for San Juan County, State of
Utah, with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
First Degree Felony; and Possession of Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor. R001R002. In an order signed August 24, 2004, by Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, Halls was
appointed counsel William L. Schultz for representation pertaining to this matter. R007R011.
On September 7, 2004, the matter came before Judge Anderson for a preliminary
hearing. At that time, the State of Utah (the "State") filed its Amended Information
charging Halls with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree
Felony; Unlawful Possession of Imitation Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor;
and Possession of Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor. R026-R028. The trial could
ordered Halls be held over to answer to the charges in the Amended Information. R029.
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On October 1, 2004, the matter came before Judge Anderson for jury trial. R04L
At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Anderson read the jury instructions to the jury, which
included the following instruction pertaining to the standard of reasonable doubt:
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the
trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown by a reasonable doubt, the
defendant should be acquitted.
The State must eliminate all reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainly. Reasonable doubt is
doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence.
Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to
satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to act
conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable
doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the
evidence in the case.
Rl 13. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Halls of each count charged in the
Amended Information. R141 at pp. 180-181. Halls waived a presentence investigation
report and time for sentencing. Id. at p. 185. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge
Anderson sentenced Halls to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on the second
degree felony charge, one year in the San Juan County Jail on the class A misdemeanor
charge, and six months in the San Juan County Jail on the class B misdemeanor charge.
M a t p. 188.
On October 5, 2004, the trial court entered its Judgment and Commitment to Utah
State Prison (the "Judgment") in this matter. R125-R127. On October 14, 2004, Halls
filed his pro se Notice ofAppeal from the Judgment, together with his pro se Motion for
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Appointment of Counsel. R128-R131. The motion was based upon Halls'intention to
appeal based upon the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. Id On November 9, 2004,
ppointed to represent Halls in further proceedings before this Court.
counsel herein was a]
R134-R135.
ffT^TVMTCNT

™ FACTS

On March 1, 2004, information respecting a possible hit-and-run accident led

C ^ * ,

a parole officer from the Department of Corrections, AduK Probation and

Paroie, to go to Hails' parents' residence to speak with Hall, R l « at PP- 78, 79, 99,
,00. UponarHving.the.de^edthatHalU.asnotatmeresidence.anddecidedto
waitforhun. Matp.99. Shortfy thereafter, HaUs arrived in a pick-up truck driven*
, A wall*'mrents' ranch with him and was Halls
Jim Abrams ("Abrams''), who worked on Halls parents ran
ex-wife's stepfather. Id at pp. 78,99.
a,u tn Halls' parents' residence, he "caught a
Abrams testified that, on approach
to Halls paren

glimpse of CHalis, bending over, and i, .ooked iike he was shoving some stuff under
thereat, RMlatp.62. When they arrived at the re.idence, Abrams testified thatHaUs
askedhim to leave, which was unusual since he normally would go in and say W
hismomerar.dhis^er.H

«o

Abrams dropped HaUs off and,eft the residence. K * P-

78.
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When Abrams arrived at his own house, he checked under the passenger seat and
testified that he found a black piece and a box with bags inside it. R141 at pp. 62-63.
Abrams testified that he took these items to the police station and gave them to Chief
Adair ("Adair"). Id. at p. 63. After arriving at the police station, Abrams requested that
Adair search his vehicle for any other items. Id. Adair did not find anything else in
Abrams vehicle.
During this time, Eberling and Clark conducted a search of Halls, his room and his
vehicle since Clark testified that Halls had been testing positive for methamphetamine.
R141 at p. 79, 100. After finding nothing in their searches, Eberling and Clark
determined to take Halls to Eberling's office. Id. Eberling testified that, as they were
approaching the police station, Adair contacted Eberling and told him somebody was at
the office and he had something for him. Id. at 79. As they arrived, Eberling testified
that he saw Abrams and Adair at Abrams pick-up truck across the street. Id.
While they were talking with Halls in Eberling's office, Adair knocked on the door
and handed the items to Eberling that were brought in by Abrams. R141 at pp. 79-80.
Eberling testified that Halls did not deny ownership of any of the items. Id. at p. 82.
Clark testified that Halls initially denied ownership of the items. Id. at p. 101. Clark
testified that Halls finally did admit that the items were his. Id. Clark testified that Halls
told him that he was scheduled to buy and ounce of methamphetamine and mix that in a
cutting agent called "MSN" to produce two ounces so he could use for free and sell the
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other ounce for his money. Id. Clark testified that Halls told him the scale was his and
that he used it to measure the substance that he was selling. Id. at p. 102. Clark testified
that Halls told him that he had memamphetamine in the two baggies previously and had
used what was in there. Id. Eberling testified that the small baggies and the scales tested
positive for memamphetamine. Id. at p. 87.
After speaking with Halls respecting the items, Eberling testified that Halls asked
if he could work some sort of deal with them on these charges. Id. at 84. Eberling
contacted Lyle Bayless, who met with Halls and arranged an agreement with him
respecting the charges. Id. at pp. 84, 119. The arrangement was for Halls to purchase
memamphetamine with a wire that evening; however, the buy was unsuccessful. Id. at p.
103. Halls was scheduled to report in the next day, but did not show up. Id. at p. 104.
Halls testified that he did not know anything about these items and denied
ownership of mem. Id. at p. 127. Halls testified that Eberling and Clark kept telling him
that he was violating his parole anyway since he had recently tested positive for
memamphetamine, so his next thought was to "save Jeff, and see if [he] could set up
some kind of deal to buy [him] more (inaudible) time." Id. at p. 126. Halls testified that
he thought maybe Abrams had been pulled over for having been with him, and then had
been caught with "some stuff." Id. at p. 127.

Halls believed that he could take

responsibility for these items and help the task force for a deal on these charges. Id
i

Halls testified that the buy was unsuccessful in the deal he had made because he had
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made up the fact that he had an arrangement to buy methamphetamine. Id. at 133. Halls
testified that he did not meet with them the following day because he had been dishonest
with them and figured he could "hidefromthem, more or less." Id. at pp. 133-134.
After conviction and waiver of the presentence investigation report and the time
for sentencing, Halls consulted with his attorney and stipulated to a previous conviction
for possession of a controlled substance for purposes of enhancement. Id. at pp. 182-183.
Prior to trial, counsel had indicated that Halls had a charge from 1997 that was entered as
a charge of possession with intent to distribute, but that this judgment was inaccurate as it
pertained to the plea Halls entered. Id. at p. 48. Halls had apparently entered a plea of
possession of a controlled substance, but the judgment itself indicates possession with
intent to distribute. Id. Both Halls' trial counsel and the State nonchalantly indicated that
maybe the prior judgment needed to be amended, but neither party moved for an
amendment of that judgment. Id. The trial court relied upon the stipulation of the parties
to enhance Halls sentence to a second degree felony one to fifteen year conviction. Id. at
p. 188.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court determined in a decision handed down on June 7, 2005,
that the element of "obviate all reasonable doubt" in a reasonable doubt jury instruction
carried with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of
proof below beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, f30. With such a
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risk inherent in the use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt," a juror may have
found Halls guilty under a standard less than that of beyond a reasonable doubt, violating
Halls due process rights under both the Utah Constitution and United States Constitution.
Although not specifically objected to at trial, this Court has previously held that the
"[e]xceptional circumstances concept may be employed as basis for reaching issues not
properly preserved for appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law
colors the Mure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex. rel. T.M.. 2003 UT App 191,
fl6,73P.3d959.
When one is confronted with an indictment charging him with a prior conviction
of a similar offense and the statute makes his alleged repetition of it a distinct crime, for
which, upon conviction of it, severer penalties are to be imposed, the word "conviction"
must be given its strict legal meaning of judgment on a plea or verdict of guilty. Com- v.
McDermott 224 Pa 363, 73 A 427, 24 LRA NS 431 (1909). The severer penalty is
imposed by the legislature because that imposed for the first offense was ineffectual. Id.
The second offense, carrying with it severer penalties is, therefore, not committed in law
until there has been judgment for the first. Id. Since a judgment had not been entered on
the first conviction, the trial court erred in relying upon a stipulation to enhance Halls'
sentence.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION
FAILED TO ACCURATELY STATE THE LAW
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless each
element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (emphasis added). The United
States Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, linking it
to both the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,278 (1993); Winship. 397 U.S. at 362,
364. "[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged." Winship. 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1073,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
The Utah Supreme Court has recently overturned its holding in State v. Robertson.
932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) setting forth a three-part test for determining whether a
reasonable doubt jury instruction was improper. State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, fl. The
first part of Robertson required the instruction to indicate that the State must "obviate all
reasonable doubt." The original concept of this prong appeared "...to derive from a fear
that in ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a juror
might misapply the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard unless she is required to search
out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence." Reyes at f25.
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The Utah Supreme Court revisited this prong in Reyes and determined to abandon
it based on the fact that the element of "obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it the
substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a
reasonable doubt. Reyes at t30. The Utah Supreme Court undertook the following
analysis:
1 2 5 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's claim that the trial
court erred when it failed to expressly instruct that the State's proof must
"obviate all reasonable doubt" as mandated by Robertson. Id. at 119. The
"obviate all reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart's dissent in
State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). There, Justice Stewart took issue with an instruction that
equated "beyond a reasonable doubt" with "an abiding conviction of the
truth of the charge." Id. He reasoned that since the standard to be applied is
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it followed that any definition of the standard
must reference the obstacle—reasonable doubt—to be overcome by the
evidence, and must convey the principle that the State must surmount the
obstacle of reasonable doubt to justify a conviction. Id. The "obviate all
reasonable doubt" concept appears to derive from a fear that in ascertaining
the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a juror might
misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard unless she is required to
search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence.
f 26 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's image of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" may be, his suggestion that the jury be instructed to
"obviate all reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque and
conceptually suspect. Not every jury will confront evidence in its
deliberations sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. The notion of
"obviating" doubt is cumbersome at best where proof is scant or lacking in
credibility. In these instances, a description of "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their conviction concerning the
strength of the evidence imparts a more accurate and useful concept of
"beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct that requires jurors to
identify doubts and assess whether the evidence overcomes them. A
universal application of the notion that the State must "obviate all
reasonable doubt" can be achieved only by tying it to the concept of the
presumption of innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array of inchoate
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reasonable doubts that the State must overcome to attain a conviction, it
follows that the State must "obviate reasonable doubts" in every case. We
do not, however, endorse this unwieldy view of the presumption of innocence.
f 27 The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is
also flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree
of proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor
standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking:
the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt
against the evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a
doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an
ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An
unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof
will serve as a legitimate basis to acquit.
*8 f 28 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" test would permit the
State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined,
the test works to improperly diminish the State's burden. Writing in the
Notre Dame Law Review, Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the
expanding prominence of the requirement that doubts be articulated. Steve
Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the
Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre
Dame L.Rev. 1165 (2003). Professor Sheppard summarized the central vice
of this trend this way:
A troubling conclusion that arises from the difficulties of the requirement of
articulability is that it hinders the juror who has a doubt based on the belief
that the totality of the evidence is insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the
specificity implied in an obligation to "give a reason," an obligation that
appears focused on the details of the arguments. Yet this is precisely the
circumstance in which the rhetoric of the law, particularly the presumption
of innocence and the state burden of proof, require acquittal.
Id at 1213.
^f 29 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of the "obviate all
reasonable doubt" element of Robertson is our belief that the exacting
demands of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be clearly and
fairly communicated through an affirmative description of the degree of
conviction that must be attained by a juror based on the evidence. We see
little to be gained by including within a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
instruction the potentially confusing concept that every defendant is entitled
to a presumption of reasonable doubt, which the State's evidence must obviate.
12

f 30 Because we conclude that "the obviate all reasonable doubt" element
of the Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt, we
expressly abandon it.
Reyes at 1RI24-30.
In the instant matter, the "reasonable doubt" jury instruction expressly indicates
that "[t]he State must eliminate all reasonable doubt," which is substantively the same as
the prong in Robertson requiring the jury instruction to "obviate all reasonable doubt"
R113. As indicated by the Utah Supreme Court, this instruction carries with it the
substantial risk that a juror found Halls guilty based on a degree of proof below beyond a
reasonable doubt. With such a risk inherent in the use of the phrase "eliminate all
reasonable doubt," a juror may have found Halls guilty under a standard less than that of
beyond a reasonable doubt, violating Halls due process rights under both the Utah
Constitution and United States Constitution.
While this issue surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction was not
preserved by trial counsel at the trial in this matter, this Court should review the matter
based upon exceptional circumstances.

This Court has previously held that the

"[exceptional circumstances concept may be employed as basis for reaching issues not
properly preserved for appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law
colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex. rel. T.M.. 2003 UT App 191,
116,73 P.3d 959. The original decision was handed down by this Court in State v. Reyes
on January 15, 2004, upholding the three-part test in Robertson, and the prong requiring
13

the use of the language "obviate all reasonable doubt." 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 84.
Review was granted by the Utah Supreme Court in that matter in May of 2004. The trial
in the instant matter was held October 1, 2004, while review of Reyes was pending. The
Opinion by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Reves, abandoning the three-part test in
Robertson was handed down on June 7, 2005. It is clear that this change in law,
overturning an eight (8) year precedent in Robertson was clearly an unsettled
interpretation of the law that colored the ability of Halls trial counsel to raise the issue
surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction.
II. ENHANCEMENT IS ONLY PROPER
WHEN FINALITY OF JUDGMENT HAS OCCURRED
IN THE FIRST CHARGE
Several jurisdictions in the United States have held that a sentence cannot be
imposed for a charge upon which judgment of conviction has not been entered. See,
People v. Johnson. 479 N.E.2d 481 (IlLApp. 2.Dist. 1985); Shargaa v. State. 102 So.2d
809 (Fla 1958), cert denied 358 U.S. 873, 3 L.Ed.2d 104, 79 S.Ct. 114; Com. V. Jones,
282 A.2d 237 (Pa. 1971); Finch v. Mavo. 189 So. 27 (Fla 1939); Com. V. McCarthy, 18
Wash. Co. 182 (Pa.Com.Pl. 1938); Horn v. State, 35 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.Crim.App. 1930).
The weight of authority is to the effect that the word "conviction" as used in statutes
providing for increased punishment for persons formerly convicted of crime necessitates
the pronouncement of sentence upon the verdict or plea of guilty in order to obtain a
judgment that is final, so far as the trial court is concerned. 5 A.L.R.2d 1080, § 16(a).
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The court in Com, v. McDermott 224 Pa 363, 73 A 427, 24 LRA NS 431 (1909),
observed that the word "conviction" has a popular and a legal meaning, stating as follows:
In common parlance a verdict of guilty is said to be a conviction...and this
popular meaning has been given to it when rights other than those of the
one who has been found guilty have been before the courts.... But a very
different situation is presented when one is confronted with an indictment
charging him with a prior conviction of a similar offense and the statute
makes his alleged repetition of it a distinct crime, for which, upon
conviction of it, severer penalties are to be imposed. In such a case the word
'conviction' must be given its strict legal meaning of judgment on a plea or
verdict of guilty. The severer penalty is imposed by the legislature because
that imposed for the first offense was ineffectual. The second offense,
carrying with it severer penalties is, therefore, not committed in law until
there has been judgment for the first.
In the instant matter, trial counsel for Halls stipulated on his behalf to the fact that
he had previously been convicted of possession. Trial counsel had researched the prior
charge and found that the judgment had incorrectly stated that Halls had been convicted
of possession with intent to distribute. While the parties nonchalantly discussed the idea
that the prior judgment need be amended, no one pursued that option. The trial court
simply allowed the stipulation to stand as proof of the prior conviction for purposes of
enchancement. However, with the amending of a prior judgment to conform to the plea
entered, nofinalityofjudgment can be presumed. If a sentence cannot be entered without
thefinalityofjudgment, then it is axiomatic that an enhanced sentence cannot be imposed
upon an individual without afinaljudgment from the first conviction. No final judgment
was entered on the first conviction respecting a prior possession charge, thus Halls'
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sentence should not have been enhanced based only upon stipulation of the parties.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Halls respectfully requests that this Court
overturn the Judgment and enter other such orders as this Court deems appropriate.
DATED THIS

day of

, 2005.

K. Andrew Fitzgerald
Attorney for Franklin Eric Halls

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
day of
, 2005,1 mailed, first class
postage prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to:
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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DATED THIS j 2 ) ^ day of

Juu^

, 2005.

K. Andrew Fitzgeralc
Attorney for Franklin Eric Halls
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Addendum ~I~
Judgment and Commitment to Utah State Prison,
dated October 5,2004

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Criminal No. 0417-086
Held in the Courtroom of said Court, at Monticello, San
Juan County, State of Utah, on October 01, 2004, present the
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District Court JudgeTHE STATE OF UTAH,
Against:

FRANKLIN ERIC HALLS,
DOB: 11/22/1977
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE PRISON

Happy Morgan, Pro-tern San Juan County Attorney, for Plaintiff
William L. Schultz, Attorney at Law, for Defendant
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court
and represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore been
found guilty by a jury of the offenses of:
COUNT 1: UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,
methamphetamine, a SECOND DEGREE FELONY;
COUNT 2: UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,
purported methamphetamine, a CLASS A MISDEMEANOR;
COUNT 3: POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA, a CLASS B MISDEMEANOR;
1

and the defendant stating to the Court that there is no legal
reason to advance why judgment should not be pronounced, the
Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of the law as
follows, to-wit:

That you, FRANKLIN ERIC HALLS, are hereby

imprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON for a term of NOT LESS THAN
ONE (1) YEAR NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) YEARS on Count 1; a term
in the SAN JUAN COUNTY JAIL of ONE (1) YEAR on Count 2; and a
term in the SAN JUAN COUNTY JAIL of SIX (6) MONTHS on Count 3.
Said prison terms are to be served concurrently with each other
but are to be served consecutively with the prison term defendant
is presently serving.
You are hereby REMANDED to the custody of the Utah
State Prison or the San Juan County Sheriff or other proper
officer for transfer to the Utah State Prison.
DATED this,*S^ day of October, 2004.
JTHE COURT:

f

Anderson
Court Judge
iappy J. Morgan
San Juan County Attorn

2

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

IT day of October, 2004

I hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the above to the following:
William L. Schultz
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 937
Moab, Utah 84532
Department of Corrections
Adult Probation and Parole
Grand County courthouse file
Happy J. Morgan

Addendum ~II~
Jury Instruction #9

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

I

A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable

doubt.

throughout the trial.

This

presumption

follows

the

defendant

If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond

a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted.
The state must eliminate a/jfreasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable
doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy,
imagination, or wholly speculative possibility.

Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince
the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and enough
to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that
reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the
case.

Addendum ~III~
State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, - - P.3d - -

State v, Reyes
— p.3d —-, 2005 WL 1330791
Utah,2005.
Jun 07,2005 (Approx. 8 pages)
2005 WL 1330791 (Utah), 2005 UT 33
— P.3d —
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAW/
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff, Petitioner, and Cross-Respondent,
v.
German Cruz REYES, Defendant, Respondent, and Cross-Petitioner.
No. 20040078.
June 7, 2005.
Third District, Salt Lake, No. 021903699; The Honorable William Barrett.
MarkL.Shurtleff. Att'y Gen., J. Frederic Voros, Jr.. Asst. Att'y Gen., Michael E. Postma,
Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Kent R. Hart, Lisa J. Remal, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
NEHRING. Justice:
INTRODUCTION
*1 % 1 We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals's ruling that the reasonable doubt
instruction used in the trial of German Cruz Reyes was improper because it did not specifically
conform to the three-part reasonable doubt instruction upheld by this court in State v. Robertson.
932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 199TI overruled on other grounds by State v. Weeks. 2002 UT 98. % 25 n.
11,61 P.3d 1000. The State asks us to overrule Robertson. We also agreed to take up Mr. Reyes's
cross-petition, which challenges the court of appealsfs determination that the trial court's refusal to
reread preliminary jury instructions at the close of evidence was harmless error. Because we share
the court of appeals's misgivings about the wisdom of Robertson, we reverse the court of appeals's
holding on the reasonable doubt instruction and announce a "safe harbor" reasonable doubt
instruction. We also affirm, on other grounds, the court of appeals's decision on the timing of the jury
instructions.

BACKGROUNDJFNll
FN1. For a complete recitation of the facts, see State v. Reves. 2004 UT App 8. fy 2-13.
84P.3d841.

12 In 2002, the State charged Mr. Reyes with aggravated assault. Before the trial began, the court
proposed reading the eighteen preliminary instructions, including instructions on the presumption
of innocence and the definition of reasonable doubt. Mr. Reyes objected to an initial reading of the
instructions unless the court reread the instructions at the end of the trial, arguing that a failure to
recite the instructions at the close of the evidence would violate his due process rights and Utah law.
Mr. Reyes also objected to the content of the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction. The
instruction read:
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of innocence. A defendant is
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Where you are satisfied that a
reasonable doubt exists as to a defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to acquittal.
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is
required, not doubt which is merely possible, since everything in human affairs is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a degree of proofthat satisfies your
mind and convinces your conscientious understanding. Reasonable doubt is doubt entertained by
reasonable men and women and arisesfromthe evidence, or lack of evidence, in the case.
If 3 Mr. Reyes asserted this instruction was improper because it did not pass the three-part content
test announced in State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Weeks. 2002 UT 98. f 25 n. 11,61 P.3d 1000. Mr. Reyes citedfirst,the instruction's failure
to comply with Robertson's mandate that a reasonable doubt instruction "specifically state that the
State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt" and, second, its improper inclusion of the phrase
"doubt which is merely possible," id. at 1232.
*214 The trial court turned away both of Mr. Reyes's objections. At the conclusion of opening
statements, the court read the eighteen preliminary jury instructions and provided each juror with a
written copy of them. The next day, before closing arguments, the court read fourteen additional
instructions and again provided each juror a written copy of the instructions. The jury found Mr.
Reyes guilty on both counts, and the court sentenced him to two concurrent terms offifteenyears
to life. Mr. Reyes appealed.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS REVIEWS REYES AND REASONABLE DOUBT
f 5 Mr. Reyes took two issues to the court of appeals. State v. Reves. 2004 UT App 8, % 1,84 P.3d
841. First, he repeated his claim that the trial court violated his "due process and jury trial rights"
under the United States Constitution because the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction did not
utilize the specific languagefromRobertson requiring the State to "obviate all reasonable doubt" and
"erroneously stated that reasonable doubt is ... not doubt which is merely possible." Id. at f 16.
Second, Mr. Reyes argued that when the trial court refused to reread the eighteen preliminary jury
instructions at the close of evidence, it violated Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6) and
therefore "his due process rights to a fair trial." Id at ^f 23.
f 6 Mr. Reyes argued that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" jury instruction was defective because

it failed to comport with the Robertson test. Id at f 16. The court of appeals took up its analysis of
Mr. Reyes's challenge not with Robertson, but with the United States Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on reasonable doubt in Victor v. Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1 (1994). In Victor, the
Supreme Court held:
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither
prohibits trial courtsfromdefining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of
course. Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt,... the Constitution does not require that any particularform of
words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. Rather, taken as a whole,
the instructions [must] correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.
Id at 5 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
17 The court of appeals contrasted the Supreme Court's guidance on reasonable doubt with ours in
Robertson. Robertson, which has been our sole occasion to review a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
instruction since the Supreme Court handed down Victor, did not acknowledge the existence of
Victor. Instead, we ratified and applied a three-part evaluative model first suggested by Justice
Stewart in his dissent in State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375. 1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Robertson described the test as follows:
*3 First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must obviate all reasonable
doubt." Second, the instruction should not state that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern
or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an instruction tends to trivialize the
decision of whether to convict. Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not
merely a possibility," although it is permissible to instruct that a "fancifiil or wholly speculative
possibility Ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1232 (citations omitted).
18 The court of appeals hewed tightly to the Robertson test in assessing Mr. Reyes's challenge. It
held that the reasonable doubt instruction given the jury in Mr. Reyes's trial failed the first and third
Robertson elements, and it accordingly remanded for a new trial. Reves. 2004 UT App 8 at f % 2122. The court of appeals reached its holding reluctantly, agreeing with the State that the rigor of the
Robertson test could not be reconciled with Victor's expansive approach to the content of reasonable
doubt instructions. Id. at 121.
f 9 The court of appeals also concluded that the trial court erred when it did not repeat the
preliminary jury instructions at the close of evidence. Id at % 24. The court read Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6) to unambiguously require that the jury should be instructed" '[w]hen
the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time.' " Id (quoting Utah R.Crim» P.
17(g)(6)). It interpreted this language to mandate a repetition of all instructions vital to the
defendant's rights at the conclusion of evidence irrespective of when or how the court had previously
delivered those instructions. However, the court of appeals held that this error was harmless because
there was no likelihood that, had the trial court repeated the preliminary instructions at the close of
evidence, the verdict would have been any different. Both parties petitioned for certiorari, which we
granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
If 10 "On certiorari, we review the court of appeals'[s] decision for correctness, giving its conclusions
of law no deference ." State v. Geukgeuzian. 2004 UT 16. f 7.86 P.3d 742.

ANALYSIS
I. UTAH'S REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
1f 11 No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless each element of the
offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358.362 (1970). The
Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, linking it to both the Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Sullivan v.
Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275.278 (1993): Winship. 397 U.S. at 362. 364. The degree of certainty of
guilt that we insist be held by those entrusted with judging the fate of persons charged with crimes
before we will permit the State to wield its power to punish is not only a measure of evidence, but
also in a more fundamental sense a gauge of our nation's conscience. The measure of certainty the
law demands before finding guilt reflects the balance we are willing to strike between ensuring that
all of the guilty are brought to justice and preventing the conviction and punishment of the innocent.
Blackstone set an enduring benchmark for the measure of certainty required to convict in a civilized
society when he stated that "the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one
innocent suffer." 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *27, quoted in Coffin v. United States. 156
U.S. 432.456 (1895).
*4 f 12 Although Blackstone expresses a moral ideal of justice which claims few detractors, his terse
pronouncement on the State's burden of proof still leaves unanswered the question of what degree
of satisfaction a juror must have with the quality and quantity of evidence beforefindinga defendant
guilty. That we have settled on "beyond a reasonable doubt" as an answer does not fully relieve the
unease courts have felt over the imprecision of this time-honored standard. The nagging sense that
the law can and should "do better" than merely instruct jurors that they must find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt accounts for a long quest to formulate a clearer, more concise, and more
understandable reasonable doubt jury instruction. For the most part, the role of this court, like that
of most appellate courts, has been as a critic of reasonable doubt instructions. In keeping with the
responsibilities of an appellate court, our contributions to the attainment of an ideal "beyond a
reasonable doubt" instruction have appeared in the form of periodic piecemeal pronouncements
approving or rejecting words, phrases, or concepts that litigants have chosen to bring to us on appeal.
As the court of appeals's struggle with Robertson aptly confirms, this process has not produced a
track record of steady or swift evolutionary progress.
113 The United States Supreme Court has followed an approach similar to ours. Although having
granted the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" a constitutional pedigree, the Supreme Court
has done little to provide direction for its integration into the day-to-day operation of the criminal
justice system. As Victor v. Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1 (1994). makes clear, the Court has instead elected
to sanction greatflexibilityin the manner in which the concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is
communicated to juries. See id. 2d 5 ("So long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the
defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt... the Constitution does not require that any
particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof").
114 Because it provides useful context for our discussion of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" and
sets out the standard of review that we apply in place of Robertson, we take a closer look at Victor.
Victor came to the Supreme Court as a consolidated review of two challenges to the content of
"beyond a reasonable doubt" jury instructions, onefromCalifornia and onefromNebraska. Id. at
6. The Court affirmed the constitutionality of both instructions. Id. The majority was persuaded that,

when the instructions were considered as a whole, there was not a reasonable likelihood that the jury
applied the instructions in a manner resulting in a finding of guilt based on a lesser standard than
beyond a reasonable doubt Id. at 14-17,21-22.
If 15 The Supreme Court had previously extended to the states its declaration that the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard is a necessary element of federal due process. Sullivan. 508 U.S. at 278.
Still, citing its lack of supervisory authority over state courts, the Victor Court stopped short of
announcing a definitive reasonable doubt instruction for use in state courts. 511 U.S. at 6. Rather,
it reiterated that the demands of due process are met when, " 'taken as a whole, the instructions
correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.'" Id. (quoting Holland v. United
States. 348 U.S. 121,140 (1954)1 The concept of reasonable doubt can be communicated in many
ways as "the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires
them to do so as a matter of course." Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
A. The State's Challenge to the Reasonable Doubt Instruction
*5 f 16 According to the State, this court has lost touch with the reasonable doubt directives of the
United States Supreme Court. In the State's view, we have strayedfromfidelityto constitutional
principles by forsaking the linguistic latitude in the formulation of reasonable doubt instructions
approved by the Supreme Court in favor of what the State characterizes as the mechanical and
unworkable Robertson test.
117 In this case, the court of appeals found that the trial court's reasonable doubt instructions failed
the Robertson test and rejected them. Reyes. 2004 UT App 8 at f 22. The State does not fault the
court of appeals for this holding, noting that it took pains to distance itselffromthe outcome when
it stated that, "[although [the Robertson ] test may be constitutionally flawed, it is not within our
power to overrule it." Id.
118 The Robertson test would not be "constitutionallyflawed"were it merely to impose restrictions
on permissible language that could be used to define "beyond a reasonable doubt," as Victor
expressly recognized that countless constitutionally permissible "beyond a reasonable doubt"
formulations could be crafted. Victor. 511 U.S. at 5-6. Victor also expressly approved the bare
charge that the jury find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, unadorned by any supplemental definition
at all. Id. Thus, the Robertson test could be constitutionally defective only if one or more of its three
elements required Utah courts to incorporate language in their "beyond a reasonable doubt"
instructions that were at odds with Victor's injunction that instructions not create a reasonable
likelihood that" fa reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt
based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause/ " Id. at 6 (quoting Cage
v. Louisiana. 498 U.S. 39.41 (1990)).
1f 19 Mr. Reyes has challenged the reasonable doubt instruction in his case under the United States
Constitution. He has not raised claims under the Utah Constitution. Thus, we, like the court of
appeals, restrict our inquiry to the federal constitution. This limitation, however, is of little
consequence here, inasmuch as none of our decisions that address the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard have turned on an interpretation of the Utah Constitution. We readily concede that neither
Robertson nor its predecessors draw upon, account for, or explain their relationship to the body of
United States Supreme Court law on the subject of reasonable doubt. Implicit in our "beyond a
reasonable doubt" cases, however, is the understanding that they are to be properly measured against
the standards established by the Supreme Court.
120 This is not to say that Victor, or any other Supreme Court case addressing reasonable doubt for

that matter, contains clear directions to those charged with drafting "beyond a reasonable doubt" jury
instructions. As the State acknowledges, the themes of Supreme Court reasonable doubt
jurisprudence are broadly stated and include a reluctance to impose upon state courts a script for a
national reasonable doubt instruction; an acknowledgment that the English language enj oys sufficient
richness and variety in its storehouse of words to permit many formulations for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that correctly convey its meaning; and a conviction that even words that in isolation
might be constitutionally offensive may be rehabilitated when considered in their context. See id at
5-6,8-15.
*6 If 21 Given the structure and rationale of the Supreme Court's "beyond a reasonable doubt"
jurisprudence, its constraints on this court are few. We are, of course, forbidden to approve
reasonable doubt language that the Supreme Court has categorically rejected. Yet only once has the
Supreme Court held a reasonable doubt instruction to violate the Due Process Clause, and that case
highlights the difficulties associated with keeping faith with the Court's guidelines. See Cage. 498
U.S. at 40-41. In Cage, the Court held that the words "substantial" and "grave," when used to
describe the degree of doubt necessary to require acquittal, unconstitutionally diminished the State's
burden by overstating the quantum of uncertainty that "substantial" and "grave" created a reasonable
doubt. Id
f 22 Following Cage, a court may have reasonably concluded it deployed either "substantial" or
"grave" into a reasonable doubt instruction at its peril. This did not, however, prove to be the case.
Victor redeemed "substantial." 511 U.S. at 19-21. Writing for six justices, Justice O'Connor
conducted a detailed contextual parsing of Mr. Victor's jury instruction, which contained the term
"substantial doubt," and concluded that when it was used to distinguish a form of doubtfrommere
"fanciful conjecture," id. at 20. it was sufficiently clear that the intended meaning of "substantial"
was "not seeming or imaginary," and not the offending that "specified to a large degree" meaning
found in Cage, id at 9. As the fate of the word "substantial" illustrates, the work of gauging the
constitutionality of a reasonable doubt jury instruction is highly context-dependent. For this reason,
it is unproductive to cullfroman instruction certain words and phrases and make claims either for
or against the constitutionality of a jury instruction based on the Supreme Court's response to their
use in a challenged instruction.
123 The Supreme Court's approval ofproviding no definition of "beyond a reasonable doubt" further
complicates the task of identifying and applying federal constitutional standards to reasonable doubt
instructions. That a jury may return a constitutionally-sanctioned verdict either unaided by any
instruction defining reasonable doubt whatsoever, or one guided by instructions constructed in
diverse ways, seems to suggest that the Supreme Court is engaging in a form of legal agnosticismconceding that an ideal definition of reasonable doubt may exist, but despairing that any one will
ever know what it looks like.
B. Turning Away From "Obviate all Reasonable Doubt"
124 Against this backdrop, we turn to the instruction to which Mr. Reyes takes exception. The court
of appeals felt constrained to reject the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction used in Mr. Reyes's
trial because they failed to satisfy the Robertson requirements that the State must "obviate all
reasonable doubt" and that it must avoid use of the phrase "reasonable doubt cannot merely be a
possibility." Reves. 2004 UT App 8 at <|ff 19. 22. The court of appeals applied two standards of
review. Id, atfflf14, 16. First, it reviewed under a nondeferential correction of error standard the
question of whether the reasonable doubt jury instruction properly applied the law set out in

Robertson. Id. at f 14. It then assessed whether the failure to conform to the Robertson test was a
"structural error11 infringing on Mr. Reyes's guarantee of due process. Id at f 16.
*7%25 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's claim that the trial court erred when it failed
to expressly instruct that the State's proof must "obviate all reasonable doubt" as mandated by
Robertson. Id. at 119. The "obviate all reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart's dissent
in State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375.1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). There, Justice
Stewart took issue with an instruction that equated "beyond a reasonable doubt" with "an abiding
conviction of the truth of the charge." Id He reasoned that since the standard to be applied is
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it followed that any definition of the standard must reference the
obstacle-reasonable doubt—to be overcome by the evidence, and must convey the principle that the
State must surmount the obstacle of reasonable doubt to justify a conviction. Id. The "obviate all
reasonable doubt" concept appears to derive from a fear that in ascertaining the conviction of the
truth of a charge against a defendant, a juror might misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard unless she is required to search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence.
126 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's image of "beyond a reasonable doubt" may be, his
suggestion that the jury be instructed to "obviate all reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque
and conceptually suspect. Not every jury will confront evidence in its deliberations sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt. The notion of "obviating" doubt is cumbersome at best where proof is
scant or lacking in credibility. In these instances, a description of "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their conviction concerning the strength of the evidence imparts
a more accurate and useful concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct that
requires jurors to identify doubts and assess whether the evidence overcomes them. A universal
application of the notion that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" can be achieved only by
tying it to the concept of the presumption of innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array of
inchoate reasonable doubts that the State must overcome to attain a conviction, it follows that the
State must "obviate reasonable doubts" in every case. We do not, however, endorse this unwieldy
view of the presumption of innocence.
127 The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is alsoflawedbecause,
contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict and in that
respect violates the Victor standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking:
the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the evidence. This
process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's merits, all to the end of determining
whether the evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either to articulate
the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet its
burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis to acquit.
*8128 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" test would permit the State to argue that it need
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test works to improperly diminish the State's
burden. Writing in the Notre Dame Law Review, Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the expanding
prominence of the requirement that doubts be articulated. Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of
Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of
Innocence. 78 Notre Dame L.Rev, 1165 (2003). Professor Sheppard summarized the central vice
of this trend this way:
A troubling conclusion that arisesfromthe difficulties of the requirement of articulability is that it
hinders the juror who has a doubt based on the belief that the totality of the evidence is insufficient.

Such a doubt lacks the specificity implied in an obligation to "give a reason," an obligation that
appears focused on the details of the arguments. Yet this is precisely the circumstance in which the
rhetoric of the law, particularly the presumption of innocence and the state burden of proof, require
acquittal.
Id at 1213.
129 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of the "obviate all reasonable doubt" element of
Robertson is our belief that the exacting demands of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can
be clearly and fairly communicated through an affirmative description of the degree of conviction
that must be attained by a juror based on the evidence. We see little to be gained by including within
a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction the potentially confusing concept that every defendant is
entitled to a presumption of reasonable doubt, which the State's evidence must obviate.
| 30 Because we conclude that "the obviate all reasonable doubt" element of the Robertson test
carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror tofindguilt based on a degree of proof below
beyond a reasonable doubt, we expressly abandon it.
C Reasonable Doubt Cannot be a "Mere Possibility"
T 31 We turn next to Mr. Reyes's claim that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction in his case
offended the Robertson proscription against the phrase "reasonable doubt cannot merely be a
possibility." This element ofRobertson was also the product of Justice Stewart's dissent in Ireland.
Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1232 (citing Ireland. 773 P.2d at 1380-82) (Stewart. J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart's fundamental objection to excluding "mere possibility" from eligibility for consideration
as reasonable doubt was that the term "possibility," standing alone, fails to disclose its location on
the continuum marked at its extremes by impossibility and certainty. Ireland. 113 P«2d at 1381
(Stewart, J., dissenting). We stand by this observation.
f 32 Robertson correctly noted that neither Justice Stewart's dissent in Irelandnor the Robertson test
it spawned outlawed all references to "possibilities" in defining reasonable doubt. Robertson. 932
P.2d at 1232- 33. To the contrary, Robertson endorsed Justice Stewart's approval of language that
" 'fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
Id (quoting Ireland. 113 P.2d at 1382) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
*9133 When complemented by appropriate qualifying and explanatory language, the use ofthe term
"mere possibility" in the definition of doubt does not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury
would apply an unconstitutionally diminished standard of proof. In fact, as the court of appeals
observed, one ofthe instructions at issue in Victor survived a challenge to its definition of reasonable
doubt as "not a mere possible doubt." Reves. 2004 UT App 8 at f 18 (quoting Victor. 511 U-S. at
7). Here, the exclusion of doubt which is " 'merely possible'" from consideration as a reasonable
doubt is followed by the explanatory phrase " 'since everything in human affairs is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt.'" This language effectively neutralizes the risk that the reference to a
"mere possibility" will improperly lead a juror to apply a standard of proof lesser than beyond a
reasonable doubt.
134 We conclude that the requirement that the jury be instructed that it must "obviate all reasonable
doubt" before it may find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is flawed and must be abandoned. The
instruction given to Mr. Reyes's jury appropriately addressed the concept of "possibility" in gauging
the reasonableness of doubt. We therefore reverse the court of appeals on this issue and affirm Mr.
Reyes's conviction.

D. A "Clear, Straightforward and Accurate" Definition ofReasonable Doubt
f 35 Although we have allied ourselves with the Supreme Court in our skepticism of the value of
"talismatic phraseology" to define the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, State v. Younz. 853
P«2d 327.347 (Utah 1993). we are convinced that the time has come to provide express guidance
to trial courts concerning the contents of a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction. We are moved
to take this action for several reasons. First, there exists a substantial inventory of reasonable doubt
formulations that have gained either express or tacit ratification by this court and other state and
federal courts. There is an understandable tendency to insert within a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
instruction multiple definitions in the hope that singularly or collectively they may bring to jurors
clarity of understanding. Such a practice is just as likely to bring about the real but unintended result
of making reasonable doubt less comprehensible. An instruction larded with multiple definitions of
reasonable doubt may also convey the incorrect message that a doubt must survive review under each
definition before it may qualify as a "reasonable doubt."
f 36 We have earlier explained our dissatisfaction with the historical approaches to appellate review
of "beyond a reasonable doubt." In general, the experience of appellate review of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" instructions has been one marked by the enterprise ofwinnowing out ill-conceived
notions of reasonable doubt. Left to follow this historical practice, we are doubtful that a serviceable
"reasonable doubt" instruction will ever emerge.
* 10137 We therefore exercise our supervisory authority to promulgate for use in the courts of this
state the instruction proposed by the Federal Judicial Center that reads:
"The [State] has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you
may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that
a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the [State's] proof must be more powerful
than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves youfirmlyconvinced of the defendant's guilt.
There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases
the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration
of the evidence, you arefirmlyconvinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must
find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you
must give him the benefit of the doubt andfindhim not guilty."
Victor. 511 U.S. at 27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 17-18 (instruction 21)).
f 38 The use of this instruction was advocated by Justice Ginsburg in her concurring opinion in
Victor. Id. She described it as "clear, straightforward, and accurate." Id. at 26. We agree. Moreover,
in the span of time since its promulgation in 1987, the instruction has enjoyed a positive reception.
[FN2] We believe that the consistent application of this instruction resolves any uncertainty in the
phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" and will benefit jurors while setting forth a balanced charge to
the State and defendants. Yet, we note that history has proven that defining "beyond a reasonable
doubt" is a process of evolution and adaptation, and in the future new definitions may emerge.
Moreover, we recognize that instructions that once enjoyed widespread acceptance became
anachronistic and inaccurate due to shifting definitions of terms. [FN3] In recognition of this
possibility, we authorize use of Federal Judiciary Center Instruction 21 in Utah courts as a "safe
harbor" instruction, but we stop short of disqualifying as constitutionally defective other reasonable
doubt instructions that conform to the principles announced in this opinion.

FN2. See, e.g., State v. Prasertphong. 75 P.3d 675.696 (Ariz.2003): Arizona v. Portillo.
898 P.2d 970.974 (Ariz.1995) (adopting and requiring use of the Federal Judicial Center's
Jury Instruction 21 as advocated by Justice Ginsburg because "the Federal Judicial Center's
proposed definition most fairly and accurately conveys the meaning of reasonable doubt");
Mills v. State. 732 A.2d 845.852 (Del.1999) (upholding the jury instruction given, which
was "almost identical to the model explanation proposed by the Federal Judicial Center");
Smith v. United States. 709 A.2d 78.81 (D.C.1998) (observing that "the approval of a single
instruction for use in all criminal trials will not intrude unduly into the area of trial court
discretion, for the standard ofproof beyond a reasonable doubt is applicable to every criminal
trial and is not subject to change because of the evidence or legal theories presented."
Winegeart v. State. 665 N.E.2d 893. 902 (Ind.1996) (recommended the Federal Jury
Instruction 21 stating that "[a] substantial improvement in effective communication may be
achieved by utilization of the Federal Judicial Center's proposed instruction").
FN3. See, e.g., Victor. 511 U.S. at 8. There the Court reviewed the reasonable doubt
instruction used in Mr. Sandoval's case. The instruction was set forth in 1850 in
Commonwealth v. Webster. 59 Mass. 295.320 (1850), and for almost one hundred years
was heralded as "probably the most satisfactory definition ever given to the words 'reasonable
doubt1 in any case known to criminal jurisprudence ." People v. Strong. 30 CaL 151.155
(1866). The instruction utilized the phrase "moral certainty," which caused the Victor Court
some concern because, as Justice O'Connor wrote, the phrase in Mr. Sandoval's case did not
likely have the same textual meaning as when it was written in 1850. Victor. 511 U.S. at 13.
She observed that "[w]ords and phrases can change meaning over time: A passage generally
understood in 1850 may be incomprehensible or confusing to a modem juror." Id. The Court
responded that it did not condone the phrase "moral certainty," but felt that overall it did not
render the reasonable doubt instruction infirm. Id. at 16-17.
II. MR. REYES'S APPEAL ON FAILURE TO REINSTRUCT THE JURY
f 39 We granted Mr. Reyes's cross-petition for certiorari to review the court of appeals's
determination that although the trial court erred when it failed to repeat its recitation of jury
instructions at the close of the evidence, the error was harmless. He insists that, as an error of
constitutional dimension, the failure to reinstruct the jury could not be harmless. We affirm the result
reached by the court of appeals that Mr. Reyes was not entitled to a new trial based on the timing of
the trial court's recitation of jury instructions, but do so on the grounds that the trial court did not
commit error.
*11 t 40 The court of appeals applied a plain meaning analysis to Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(g)(6). State v. Reves. 2004 UT Aop 8, % 24.84 P.3d 841. Rule 17(g)(6) instructs that
"[w]hen the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the
jury." Utah R.Crim. P. 17(g)(6). The court of appeals concluded that the text of the rule required
that the trial court repeat the recitation of preliminary jury instructions at the close of the evidence.
Reves. 2004 UT App 8 at t f 23-24. It therefore held that the trial court erred in refusing Mr. Reyes's
request for a second recitation of the instructions at the conclusion of evidence. Id at f 26. Having

determined that the trial court violated rule 17(g)(6). the court of appeals reasoned that it need not
take up Mr. Reyes's claim that the failure to comply with rule 17(g)(6Ys timing requirements for
reciting instructions denied him due process. Id. at f 26 n. 7. It then analyzed the degree of prejudice
the error caused Mr. Reyes. Id. at If 27. Using the standard set out in rule 30 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913.920 (Utah 1987), the court of
appeals found the error harmless because the likelihood of a different outcome was not sufficiently
high to undermine confidence in the verdict. Id. atffl[27-28.
141 Mr. Reyes does not challenge the court of appeals's conclusion that the trial court's error did not
undermine confidence in the guilty verdict rendered against him. Rather, he contends that the trial
court's error was constitutional in its nature and structural in its magnitude and, thus, its gravity was
more substantial than the court of appeals acknowledged. For this reason, Mr. Reyes argued that the
harmless error test employed by the court of appeals was not sufficiently rigorous. Where a
defendant's constitutional rights have been infringed, prejudice should be presumed or, at a
minimum, the burden should be placed on the State to prove the absence of prejudice beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, Mr. Reyes's challenge to the propriety of the court of appeals's standard for
evaluating harmlessness is inextricably connected to the nature ofthe right associated with the timing
of the recitation ofjury instructions. [FN4]
FN4. We note that neither the State nor Mr. Reyes sought certiorari to challenge the court
of appeals's determination that the trial court erred when it failed to repeat its recitation of
the preliminary instructions at the close of the evidence. However, our consideration of this
issue is made permissible, even inevitable, by the formulation of Mr. Reyes's cross-petition
for certiorari review. By urging us to consider whether the trial court's jury instruction
method resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights, Mr. Reyes has asked us to examine
the magnitude of the trial court's error. This inquiry logically and necessarily includes the
possibility that we might conclude that no error occurred.
If 42 Based on our assessment of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the trial court's
presentation of instructions to the jury, we hold that the timing of the trial court's recitation ofjury
instructions complied with rule 17(g)(6). Since there was no error, we need not review the court of
appeals's assessment of the harmfiilness of the error.
143 Rule 17(g)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[w]hen the evidence is
concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury." Utah RCrim. P.
17(g)(6). Contrary to the court of appeals's determination that this provision is unambiguous, we can
extract several plausible interpretations of its text. The interpretative divide occurs at the term
"instruct." One reasonable interpretation of rule 17(g)(6) is the one embraced by the court of appeals.
Under its rendition of the text, the rule mandates a complete rereading of all instructions when the
evidence is concluded. This interpretation can be traced to the assumption that the word "instruct,"
although a verb, also connotes a noun defined as the entire body of jury instructions. The court of
appeals finds comfort in this reading because it inoculates the rule against the mischief of permitting
a trial court to comply with its terms by merely reading one instruction at the close of the evidence.
Reves. 2004 UT App 8 at f 24.
* 12 f 44 The interpretation chosen by the court of appeals to sidestep one absurd result exposes the
rule to an equally incongruous one. A complete repetition of instructions would force a judge to read
and the jury to endure instructions, such as those describing "order of presentation" or "note-taking,

that have no relevance at the close of the trial and have no bearing on law applicable to the case or
to the jury's responsibilities upon retiring to deliberate. A categorical requirement that all instructions
be repeated at the close of evidence would strip the trial judge of any discretion in selecting timely
and helpful directions to the jury and would likely tend to distract the jury and dilute its attention to
critical substantive and procedural guidance present in other instructions. In implicit recognition of
the difficulties with a categorical and nondiscretionary reading of rule 17(g)(6). the court of appeals
first embraced, but then receded from the requirement that a trial court reread at the close of the
evidence all of the instructions it had previously delivered. While at first indicating that a trial court
would violate rule 17(g)(6) "by giving the jury some of its instructions before opening statements
(an "appropriate time") and the rest of its instructions before closing arguments," the court modified
its view by the time it announced its holding. Id. There, it insisted only that the trial court repeat only
those instructions that relate to the defendant's fundamental rights. Id. It is not clear to us how this
retreatfroman "all or nothing" interpretation of rule 17(g)(6) can be squared with a plain meaning
interpretation of the rule thatfindsits text unambiguous.
f 45 A second plausible interpretation of rule 17(g)(6) can be derived by restricting the meaning of
"instruct" to its verb form, describing the act of reciting an instruction. This interpretation would
require trial judges to provide some instruction when the evidence is concluded, but would not offer
guidance on the nature and extent of the instructions to be given at that stage of the trial. In our view,
an interpretation of rule 17(g)(6) that leaves undefined the scope of instructions that the court must
recite at the close of the evidence is preferable to a rendering of the rule that, in its attempt to achieve
certainty and uniformity in the presentation of instructions, will accomplish the opposite. Trial
judges faced with the obligation to repeat all instructions previously recited at the conclusion of the
evidence would have good reason to opt to avoid giving preliminary instructions at all rather than
risk the confusion and distraction ofrepeating instructions ill-suited for that occasion. We have scant
reservation about resolving the ambiguity created by construing "instruct" as a verb by ceding to trial
judges the discretion to determine the appropriate instructions to deliver to the jury at the close of
the evidence.
* 13 f 46 Although we agree generally with the court of appeals's concern that the jury be instructed
"on matters of law vital to the rights of a defendant" at the close of the evidence, we do not read rule
17(g)(6) to demand the repetition of even "vital rights" instructions at the close of the evidence in
all instances. In a trial of short duration or where the trial judge has had occasion to provide
instruction concerning one or more "vital rights" shortly before the close of the evidence, the jury's
comprehension of those "vital rights" may be enhanced by the judicious exercise of the judge's
discretion in fashioning close of evidence instructions which take a form other than a rereading of
instructions previously delivered.
1 47 The paramount goal that guides the timing of the recitation of an instruction is jury
comprehension. The importance of jury comprehension is evident from the text of rule 19 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R.Crim. P. 19. In addressing the topic of jury
instructions, rule 19 was substantially rewritten in 2001 as part of a comprehensive jury reform
initiative undertaken by this court and the Utah Judicial Council. The new rule 19 instructs:
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may instruct the jury concerning
the jurors1 duties and conduct, the order of proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the
alleged crime, and the definition of terms. The court may instruct the jury concerning any matter
stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by the court and any matter the court in its discretion
believes will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Preliminary instructions shall be in writing

and a copy provided to each juror. At thefinalpretrial conference or at such other time as the court
directs, a party mayfilea written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the
request. The court shall inform the parties of its action upon a requested instruction prior to
instructing the jury, and it shall furnish the parties with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless
the parties waive this requirement.
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the juiy on the law if the instruction will
assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior to giving the written instruction, the court shall
advise the parties of its intent to do so and of the content of the instruction. A party may request an
interim written instruction.
Id at 19(a)-(b) (2003).
148 The common objective of these provisions is jury comprehension. The means chosen to pursue
the end of better jury comprehension is a grant of expanded flexibility in the content of jury
instructions and the timing of their recitation to the jury. It is impossible for us to harmonize the
pragmatic tone of rule 19 with a hidebound interpretation of rule 17, and we decline to do so.
f 49 The trial judge's decision to forego the repetition ofjury instruction in this case was well within
the bounds of discretion afforded by rule 17 and rule 19. As noted by the court of appeals, less than
twenty-four hours separated the trial court's reading of the preliminary instructions from the
conclusion of the evidence. In addition, the jury was provided with a written copy of every
instruction. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appealsfs result on the issue of the trial court's timing
of its recitation ofjury instructions, but on different grounds.
CONCLUSION
* 14150 For the reasons detailed herein, we reverse the court of appeals and reinstate Mr. Reyes's
conviction. We abandon Robertson's insistence that the jury be instructed that to return a guilty
verdict it must "obviate all reasonable doubts." We authorize for use in our court the Federal Judicial
Center's Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 21. We also affirm on alternate grounds the court of
appeals's refusal to grant Mr. Reyes relief on his challenge to the timing of the jury instructions.
151 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice WILKINS. Justice DURRANT, and Justice
PARRISH concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion.
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